Socio-Legal Review
Volume 17

Issue 1

Article 6

September 2022

The Supreme Court Collegium and Transparency: A NonCommittal Relationship
Rangin Pallav Tripathy

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/slr

Recommended Citation
Tripathy, Rangin Pallav (2022) "The Supreme Court Collegium and Transparency: A Non-Committal
Relationship," Socio-Legal Review: Vol. 17: Iss. 1, Article 6.
Available at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/slr/vol17/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Socio-Legal Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact library@nls.ac.in.

THE SUPREME COURT COLLEGIUM AND
TRANSPARENCY: A NON-COMMITTAL
RELATIONSHIP
—Rangin Pallav Tripathy*

The Supreme Court collegium in India, which is the determining authority for the appointment of judges to the higher
judiciary, has often been derided for its secretive functioning and opaque practices. This paper provides an empirical
assessment of the collegium’s commitment to transparency
through an examination of its published resolutions. A study
of all the published resolutions, over a period of more than
three years, shows that the practice of information disclosure
by the collegium cannot be attributed with the value of transparency. The collegium has systematically failed to disclose
critical information essential to an enhanced understanding
of its functioning. An overwhelming majority of its decisions
are not reasoned. The resolutions fail to provide a meaningful understanding of the considerations, based on which
candidates are selected or rejected. While the step taken to
publish the resolutions was in the right direction, the collegium has reneged on its declared objective of promoting
transparency.
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I. A COMMITMENT TO BE TRANSPARENT
When the Indian Supreme Court decided to strike down the constitutional
amendments, establishing the National Judicial Appointments Commission in
Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn v Union of India,1 it quite clearly
admitted the severe flaws in the functioning of the collegium. It also admitted
the need for meaningful reform in how the collegium functioned. This led to
another judicial order wherein the Court sanctioned a process of public consultation to seek suggestions on the trajectory of reform.2 Seemingly inspired by
this spirit of reform, on October 3, 2017, the Supreme Court Collegium, presided by J. Dipak Misra,3 decided to publish the resolutions of the collegium
concerning the appointment of judges to the High Courts and Supreme Court,
the appointment of Chief Justices to the High Courts, and the transfer of High
Court judges. The succeeding Chief Justices have continued the practice of
publishing the minutes. However, there has been a substantial regression in the
extent of information disclosed since October 2019, when the collegium headed
by J. Ranjan Gogoi drastically changed the manner in which resolutions are
published.
At the time of initiating the practice of publishing resolutions, the declared
objective was ensuring transparency in the collegium system while also maintaining confidentiality.4 The collegium also explicitly stated that its decisions
will be published along with reasons.
1

2

3

4

See Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn v Union of India (2016) 5 SCC 1 (Supreme
Court of India). Since 1993, by force of a series of judicial orders, judges in the Supreme
Court and the High Courts are appointed by a judicial collegium headed by the Chief Justice
of India. For the appointment of Supreme Court judges, the collegium consists of the Chief
Justice and the four senior-most judges of the Supreme Court. For the appointment of High
Court judges, the collegium consists of the Chief Justice and two senior-most judges of the
Supreme Court. The Constitution was amended to establish a National Judicial Appointments
Commission, which would have substituted the collegium. The composition of the
Commission included the Union Minister for Law and Justice. This amendment was struck
down by the Supreme Court, on the ground that it compromised the primacy of the judiciary
in the appointment of judges. The Court held that primacy of the judiciary in appointment of
judges is an essential component of judicial independence, and judicial independence, being
a part of the constitutional basic structure, cannot be tinkered with. For more, see Supreme
Court Advocates-on-Record Assn v Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 441: AIR 1994 SC 268
(Supreme Court of India) and Special Reference No 1 of 1998, In re (1998) 7 SCC 739 : AIR
1999 SC 1 (Supreme Court of India).
Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn v Union of India (2015) 6 SCC 408 (Supreme
Court of India).
The other four members of the collegium were J Ranjan Gogoi, J Jasti Chelameswar, J Madan
B. Lokur and J Kurian Joseph.
The term ‘confidentiality’ did not feature in the agenda of the meeting, but is mentioned in
the decision taken at the meeting. It may be seen as an attempt to temper the expectations
regarding how transparent the collegium was actually going to be. See ‘Re: Transparency
in Collegium System’ (Supreme Court of India) <https://main.sci.gov.in/pdf/collegium/2017.10.03-Minutes-Transparency.pdf> accessed 31 January 2021.
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This paper provides an empirical analysis of the collegium’s resolutions by
measuring the extent of information that has been shared through these resolutions. First, I discuss the basic attributes which shape the idea of transparency, and also ascertain the perspective from which the information shared in
the resolutions is to be examined. The analysis is primarily focused on three
issues: the collegium’s consultative process, the Union Government’s feedback
on collegium recommendations, and the reasoning behind the collegium’s decisions. For each of these broad issues, a determinative list of information is
identified, which one would reasonably expect the collegium to share through
its resolutions. The findings on transparency are based on the extent to which
such identified information is actually shared through the resolutions.
We find that the collegium has used the practice of publishing resolutions
mostly as a formality, without exhibiting any tangible measures of transparency. The information shared in the resolutions does not lead to an improved
understanding of its functioning. It has particularly failed in indicating the reasons behind its decisions. Instead, generic platitudes have been used to sidestep
the requirement of dealing with specifics. On certain other occasions, the linguistic expression has undergone a seemingly deliberate change, which serves
the cause of obfuscation and not transparency.

II. THE VALUE OF TRANSPARENCY
The collegium’s commitment to be more transparent about the appointment
process, by itself, provides us with sufficient reason to examine its policies in
this respect. However, it is also important to recognize the democratic value
of transparency, and how it ought to be a binding norm instead of a voluntary commitment. Transparency is not simply an end in itself, but it serves a
utilitarian function in various contexts. One of the most significant benefits of
increased transparency is that it contributes towards generating greater trust in
institutions and in functionaries.5 It is well established that judicial transparency contributes positively to public trust in judges.6 While there have been
limited instances of transparency having an adverse impact on public perception towards political institutions,7 the findings are clear that the judiciary benefits from greater transparency about its functioning.8
5

6
7

8

Stephan Grimmelikhuijsen and Albert Klijn, ‘The Effects of Judicial Transparency on Public
Trust: Evidence from a Field Experiment’ (2015) 93(4) Public Administration 995.
ibid.
B Worthy, ‘More Open but Not More Trusted? The Effect of the Freedom of Information Act
2000 on the United Kingdom Central Government’ (2010) 23(4) Governance 561; J De Fine
Licht, ‘Do We Really Want to Know? The Potentially Negative Effect of Transparency in
Decision Making on Perceived Legitimacy’ (2011) 34(3) Scandinavian Political Studies 183.
See JL Gibson and GA Caldeira, Citizens, Courts, and Confirmations: Positivity Theory and
the Judgments of the American People (1st edn, Princeton University Press 2009).
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The Supreme Court of India has also recognized the principle of extending
the reach of transparency, beyond the executive, to include the judicial apparatus along with the issue of judicial appointments.9 The clearest implementation
of this principle has been in the case of Subhash Agarwal, where the Court
held that the office of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is subject to the
Right to Information Act, 2005.10 The ruling in this case was founded on the
acceptance that transparency is important in the context of judicial appointments.11 The Court also endorsed the idea that the judiciary’s standard of transparency has a bearing on how its capacity to be independent is perceived.12
It is a fact that the judiciary depends on public perception for its functional
relevance.13 The judiciary’s lack of coercive authority means that, to a great
extent, it depends on the voluntary obedience of people for the efficacy of its
decisions. The chances of people voluntarily submitting to a judicial authority
increase when the judiciary enjoys public trust and confidence.14 In this sense,
the requirement of public trust in the judiciary is not merely a desirable element of a democracy, but an indispensable one.15 Transparency is deemed to
be an important element of good governance, and is supposed to elicit trust
in people.16 Some have argued that transparency is an essential component
of any democratic structure, and that a commitment to transparency can be
equated with a commitment to democracy.17 The Indian judiciary also employs
the rhetoric of trust to claim a position of moral authority in the constitutional
scheme.18 It regularly expects to be given the benefit of doubt with respect to
its integrity and impartiality. Thus, norms of transparency, that have a clear
role in bolstering the social legitimacy of the judiciary, ought to be regarded as
an essential attribute of its institutional identity.19
9
10

11
12
13

14

15

16
17

18

19

SP Gupta v Union of India 1981 Supp SCC 87: AIR 1982 SC 149 [84] (J PN Bhagawati).
Supreme Court of India v Subhash Chandra Agarwal (2020) 5 SCC 481 (Supreme Court of
India).
ibid [44] (J DY Chandrachud).
ibid [43] (J DY Chandrachud).
See Edward J Schoenbaum, ‘Improving Public Trust and Confidence in Administrative
Adjudication: What an Administrative Law Judge Can Do’ (2001) 21(1) Journal of the
National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 1.
Tom R Tyler, ‘Trust and Democratic Governance’ in Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi
(eds), Trust and Governance (Russel Sage Foundation 2003) 272.
Shimon Shetreet, ‘Judicial Independence and Accountability: Core Values in Liberal
Democracies’ in HP Lee (ed), Judiciaries in Comparative Perspective (1st edn, Cambridge
University Press 2011) 6; Rangin Pallav Tripathy, ‘Access to Justice and Judicial Performance
Evaluation’ (2015) 2(1) NLUO Law Journal Special Edition on Access to Justice 106.
Grimmelikhuijsen and Klijn (n 5).
James R Hollyer, B Peter Rosendorff and James Raymond Vreeland, ‘Democracy and
Transparency’ (2011) 73(4) The Journal of Politics 1191.
Rangin Pallav Tripathy and Chandni Kaur Bagga, ‘Who are Our Judges? Assessing the
Information Disclosure Practice of Indian Supreme Court Judges’ (2020) 9 Indian Journal of
Constitutional Law 92.
As per Richard Fallon, social legitimacy stands for the extent to which the public supports
and trusts the judiciary as being capable of discharging its functions. See Richard H Fallon Jr,
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III. CONTEXTUALIZING TRANSPARENCY
At the outset, it is important to distinguish transparency from the mere disclosure of information. A practice of disclosing information must fulfil certain
qualitative attributes to be recognized as a practice of transparency. In fact,
it is quite common for ‘information disclosure’ to be used as a tool to avoid
transparency. One way to do so is to hide pertinent information within an avalanche of data.20 Another way is to share irrelevant information which is not
sought by any of the stakeholders.21
One of the fundamental purposes of transparency is to generate trust and
credibility among the stakeholders. Transparency must facilitate an enhanced
understanding, among the stakeholders, of the matters considered relevant by
them. Thus, one has to ascertain the utility of the shared information from the
perspective of the stakeholders concerned. Unless the quantity, structure, and
content of the information shared is oriented towards enhancing stakeholders’
understanding of the institution or process in question, transparency cannot be
attributed to such disclosure. The additional information must lead to a more
informed comprehension among them than what existed earlier. Rawlins identifies as many as 13 qualities, which organizations must incorporate in the information they share, to maintain transparency.22
In the context of the Supreme Court collegium, the adoption of this practice of ‘supposed’ transparency seems to be motivated by the stringent and
valid criticism regarding its opaque functioning.23 The adoption of a moral and

20

21

22

23

Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press
2018) 21.
Rawlins explains how over sharing of information can be used as a tactic to hide information which is actually needed. He cites the example of legal teams burying an opposite party
with mountains of documents to make it harder for relevant information to be located. See
Brad Rawlins, ‘Give the Emperor a Mirror: Toward Developing a Stakeholder Measurement of
Organizational Transparency’ (2009) 21(1) Journal of Public Relations Research 71.
Heimstädt and Dobusch contend that disclosure of information can be regarded as a characteristic of transparency only when the information shared is relevant from the perspective
of the observer. The information must be needed by the observer for it to have any utility. See Maximilian Heimstädt, Leonhard Dobusch ‘Politics of Disclosure: Organizational
Transparency as Multiactor Negotiation’ (2017) 78(5) Public Administration Review 727.
Rawlins (n 20). According to Rawlins, information ought to be inclusive, auditable (verifiable),
complete, relevant, accurate, neutral, comparable, clear, timely, accessible, reliable, honest,
and hold the organization accountable.
Prashant Bhushan, ‘Scuttling Inconvenient Judicial Appointments’ (2014) 49(28) Economic
and Political Weekly 12; Markandey Katju, ‘One Way to Fix the Collegium is to Televise its
Proceedings’ (The Wire, 5 November 2015) <https://thewire.in/law/one-way-to-fix-the-collegium-is-to-televise-its-proceedings> accessed 11 December 2020, Pradeep Thakur, ‘Collegium
Lacks Transparency, Needs Reforms: Justice Shah’ (The Times of India, November 28 2016)
<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Collegium-lacks-transparency-needs-reformsJustice-Shah/articleshow/55656623.cms> accessed 10 December 2020, Santosh Paul (ed),
Choosing Hammurabi: Debates on Judicial Appointments (Lexis Nexis 2013).
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constitutional high ground, in relation to the power of judicial appointments,24
has also meant that it may not be entirely impervious to persistent criticism.
The fact that the collegium, despite its changing composition, has continued
the practice of publishing resolutions suggests that we might be looking at the
inception of an ‘institutional norm’, which cannot be discontinued at the personal whims of future collegium members. An institutional norm becomes an
entrenched practice when it is not susceptible to periodic change with a change
in leadership. No member of the collegium, which took the decision to publish resolutions in 2017, is in office any longer, but the practice of publishing
resolutions has continued. On the downside, since October 2019, the collegium
has minimized the scope of information disclosed in its resolutions. At present, it would be premature to qualify it as a practice of organizational transparency.25 It also cannot be accurately characterized as a practice of ‘individual’
transparency, wherein individuals adopt practices with personal motivations,
without there being any institutional tradition.26 The uninterrupted continuance
of the practice in future, along with an expansion in the scope of information
disclosed, would provide more compelling evidence of the development of an
institutional norm.

A. The Public as the Important Stakeholder
As the attribute of transparency is to be assessed from the perspective of
stakeholders, we first need to identify the relevant stakeholders in this context. There is a marginal informational deficit between the Union Government
and the collegium. The friction between the executive and the collegium has
centered on authority and not on access to information. The recommendations
of the concerned High Court collegium are routed to the Supreme Court collegium through the Department of Justice, Government of India,27 and it has
access to all material, on record, about prospective appointees. The government
24

25

26

27

See SCAORA 2016 (n 1) [394]-[396]. While striking down the executive’s claim to appoint
judges, the Supreme Court has adopted the rhetoric of questioning the moral credibility of
political functionaries. It has argued that the executive cannot be trusted to exercise the power
of judicial appointments and is likely to misuse it.
See Heimstädt and Dobusch (n 21). Heimstädt and Dobusch define organizational transparency as “systematic programs for information disclosure that meet information needs external
to the organization.” The current practice falls short of this standard by various measures.
So far, there has been no effort on the part of the collegium to solicit feedback from various
stakeholders. The disclosure also lacks a system as there does not seem to have been a great
deal of deliberation about the purpose and methodology of information disclosure.
An initiative of individual transparency would be confined to the disclosure of information
about oneself even though others are not sharing similar information to the public. An example of this would be if a judge decided to declare the assets and liabilities of all her family
members (not simply the spouse) without a legal obligation to do so.
The High Court collegium consists of the Chief Justice and two senior-most judges of the concerned High Court. The High Court collegium has the sole authority to initiate the appointment process of a judge in the concerned High Court.
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is not dependent on the published resolutions to gain access to details about the
selection process.
Though those in the legal profession (lawyers, judges in the district judiciary, etc.) are not always adequately informed, they have greater awareness
about the working of the system than outsiders. That the insiders in an organization would have greater awareness is an evident fact. The same would apply
in the case of any other organization as well. Just as the staff in a university
would know more about the background of the members of its governing council than outsiders, lawyers are likely to be better informed about the background of judges. It is the general public which is often in the dark about the
entire process.
For example, if the Supreme Court is considering a candidate from the
Bombay High Court, those in the legal profession will invariably be aware as
to which serving judge(s) in the Supreme Court, elevated from the Bombay
High Court, will be consulted in the matter. On the other hand, a member of
the general public, who is not an insider, will be clueless. She will have to
put in extra effort to unearth that information either from publicly available
sources or by speaking to those in the legal profession.
It is important to note that published resolutions are the only publicly available record concerning the process of judicial appointments. The collegium is
quite aware that the public does not have access to any other documentation
on the appointment of judges. Thus, one has to place a greater informational
burden on the resolutions than one otherwise would. It means, at this moment
in time, we ought to expect greater disclosure of information from the resolutions than we ordinarily would. The resolutions ought to serve as a self-sufficient explanatory account of the decisions taken by the collegium. They are not
adequate if one has to search for information from other fragmented sources to
obtain a comprehensive picture. As the resolutions are meant for the public at
large, the sufficiency of the information ought to be tested on the yardstick of
a ‘lay person’, and not that of a legal professional conversant with the institutional dynamics of the judiciary.
For an effective analysis, there need to be tangible indicators through which
the claim of transparency can be assessed. This requires the identification of
information, which is relevant in the context of judicial appointments, and
which the public can reasonably have a legitimate expectation to be informed
about. This paper identifies some minimum denominators in the context of
judicial appointments in India, and then verifies if the resolutions published
by the collegium incorporate these denominators. These denominators may be
considered as ‘indispensable factual details’ to obtain any meaningful understanding of the decisions taken by the collegium. The checklist of relevant
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information is specific to the constitutional context in India. In order to appreciate the contextual background of the identified parameters, it is pertinent to
briefly outline the procedural framework through which judges to the High
Courts are appointed.28

IV. THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF THE
APPOINTMENT PROCESS
The bare text of Article 217 provides that while appointing judges to the
High Courts, the President is required to ‘consult’ the Chief Justice of India,
the Governor of the concerned State, and the Chief Justice of the concerned
High Court. Since 1993, this arrangement has been upended in a manner
where the collegium, headed by the Chief Justice of India, is no longer a ‘consulted’ authority but one which consults other functionaries while taking the
final decision.29
According to the revised procedure, which is currently in place,30 to give
effect to the decisions of the Supreme Court in 1993,31 1999,32 and 2015,33 the
process of appointments to a High Court is initiated by the Chief Justice of the
concerned High Court in consultation with two of the senior-most judges of the
same High Court (the ‘High Court collegium’). The names recommended by
the High Court collegium are forwarded to the Union Minister for Law, Justice
and Company Affairs, and shared with the office of the Chief Minister and the
office of the Governor. The Governor, as advised by the Chief Minister, communicates her inputs on the recommendations to the Union Minister for Law,
Justice and Company Affairs. The existing procedure does not contemplate any
direct consultative dialogue between the High Court collegium and the State
executive, or between the Supreme Court collegium and the State executive.
Instead, the views of the State executive are taken into consideration by the
Supreme Court collegium, while deciding on the recommendations made by
the High Court collegium. Thus, the State executive performs the role of an
‘indirect consultee’ for the Supreme Court collegium.
28

29
30

31
32
33

This paper covers only the resolutions relating to appointment of High Court judges. See
Section V.
See SCAORA 1994 (n 1).
A Memorandum of Procedure has been drawn up to regulate the process of judicial appointments by the Department of Justice, Government of India, in consultation with the collegium. All appointments to the Supreme Court and the High Courts are supposed to be done
as per this Memorandum. For the procedure about High Court judges, see ‘Memorandum of
Procedure of Appointment of High Court Judges’ (Department of Justice) <https://doj.gov.in/
appointment-of-judges/memorandum-procedure-appointment-high-court-judges> accessed 20
March 2021.
SCAORA 1994 (n 1).
Special Reference No. 1 of 1998, In re (n 1).
SCAORA 2016 (n 1).
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The Department of Justice (‘DoJ’), acting under the Union Minister for
Law, Justice and Company Affairs, operates as the ‘coordinating agency’. It
compiles the materials in relation to a proposed candidate (which are the recommendations of the High Court collegium, the views of the State executive,
and inputs from the Intelligence Bureau) and forwards it to the Supreme Court
collegium.
Upon receiving the compiled materials from the DoJ, the Supreme Court
collegium follows a consultative procedure,34 wherein it is obligated to consult such colleagues in the Supreme Court, who might be conversant with the
affairs in the concerned High Court. The Supreme Court is also free to consult
such other persons as it feels may provide useful assistance. Such persons may
include serving judges in the Supreme Court/High Court, retired judges from
the Supreme Court/High Court, members of the Bar, etc.
When the Supreme Court collegium takes the final decision on a particular candidate, the file is sent back to the Union Minister for Law, Justice and
Company Affairs. If the Supreme Court collegium has decided to not appoint
the candidate, the government has no other option but to accept the decision.
However, if the collegium selects a candidate, the government may either
accept the recommendation or return it to the collegium for a reconsideration. As per the existing framework, if the Supreme Court collegium reiterates
its decision, the government does not have the option to reject the candidate.
While the government may lack the express authority to reject a recommendation of the Supreme Court collegium, it is known to keep a file pending, at
times for years, to negotiate with the collegium.35

V. SOURCE OF DATA AND FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
All resolutions of the collegium are published on the official website of the
Supreme Court. The resolutions are uploaded as separate PDF documents. For
the purpose of this study, all such documents were downloaded and scrutinized
individually. The subject-matter of the resolutions can be categorized as:
1. Appointment of judicial officers/lawyers as additional judges in the
High Courts;
2. Confirmation of additional judges in High Courts as Permanent judges;
3. Appointment of High Court judges/lawyers as Supreme Court judges;
34
35

SCAORA 1994 (n 1) [68]-[69] (J S. Verma).
Bhadra Sinha, ‘16 Names Cleared by the SC Collegium for HC Judge Posts Stuck with Govt,
6 of Them Since 2019’ (The Print, 28 January 2021) <https://theprint.in/judiciary/16-namescleared-by-sc-collegium-for-hc-judge-posts-stuck-with-govt-6-of-them-since-2019/593258/>
accessed 21 March 2021.
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4. Transfer of High Court Judges;
5.	 Appointment of High Court Chief Justices.
The analysis in this paper only covers the appointment of additional High
Court Judges. This category of decisions is taken by the Supreme Court collegium, in the form of considering the recommendations originating from the
concerned High Court collegium. For other kinds of decisions, apart from the
appointment of permanent judges to the High Courts, the Supreme Court collegium initiates the process on its own.
From October 3, 2017 to March 19, 2021, a total of 135 resolutions dealing with 477 candidates have been analysed. This time period overlaps with
the tenure of three different Chief Justices – J. Dipak Misra, J. Ranjan Gogoi,
and J. S.A. Bobde. During this time, other members of the collegium were -36
J. Jasti Chelameswar, J. Madan Bhimaro Lokur, J. Kurian Joseph, J. Arjan
Kumar Sikri, J. N.V. Ramanna, J. Arun Mishra, and J. R.F. Nariman.
The data, and its analysis, has been divided into two distinct phases. The
first phase is from October 3, 2017 to October 3, 2019. The second phase is
from October 15, 2019 to March 19, 2021. This bifurcation becomes necessary
as the collegium has followed different patterns of recording its resolutions in
these two phases. While the disclosure practices of the collegium in the first
phase were hardly satisfactory, the collegium has further regressed in the second phase by narrowing down the nature of information it discloses. Due to
the severely limited nature of information shared by the collegium in the second phase, it would be futile to examine such resolutions through the same
parameters which have been adopted for the first phase.
Keeping in mind the procedural framework in place for the appointment of
judges to the High Courts,37 the transparency practices of the Supreme Court
collegium have been analysed under three categories:
1. Consultation with judicial colleagues;
2. Feedback from the Government (Union and State);
3.	 Final decisions along with reasons.

36

37

For appointing judges to the various High Courts, the collegium consists of the Chief Justice
of India and two senior-most judges of the Supreme Court.
See Section IV.
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VI. ASSESSING TRANSPARENCY: PHASE ONE
A. Consultation with Judicial Colleagues
As we have noted,38 when selecting a candidate for a particular High Court,
the Supreme Court collegium is required to consult judicial colleagues in the
Supreme Court, who are conversant with the affairs of the concerned High
Court. One would expect at least the following two details from the resolutions
published by the collegium: (i) the identities of the judicial colleagues consulted; and (ii) the views of the consultees.
Knowing the mere identity of the consultees would be futile without clarity
on the content of their views. Thus, it would also be a reasonable expectation
that the views of the consultee are mentioned with a clear sense of whether the
views are positive or negative in relation to a prospective appointee. In an ideal
scenario, the reasons for a negative or positive view should also be shared.
However, the least we should know is whether the functionaries consulted are
in favour of or in opposition to a proposed candidate.
Ascertaining the identities of functionaries, such as the Governor and the
Chief Minister, is relatively easy for the general public even if they have not
been named expressly. It gets more complicated when it comes to the identity
of the ‘judges conversant with the affairs of the High Court’. For example, let
us consider that the Supreme Court collegium is looking into appointments to
XYZ High Court. The ‘colleagues conversant with the affairs’ of that High
Court includes judges who served in the High Court, even though it was not
their Parent High Court.39 It also includes judges for whom XYZ was the parent High Court and those who served as Chief Justices in that High Court.
Unless such colleagues are clearly identified by name, it becomes arduous for
a lay person to ascertain their identities. Also, if and when the collegium consults other stakeholders, it would obviously be necessary to refer to them by
name. Thus, for the sake of efficiency and ease, a reasonable practice would be
to mention the names of all the consultees.
The Supreme Court collegium’s practice in this context is mostly unsatisfactory. The resolutions never clearly identify the ‘judges conversant with the
affairs of the High Court’ who have been consulted. In fact, quite often, there
is not even adequate clarity on how many judges have been consulted while
taking decisions. The nature of their views is also not always clear.
38
39

ibid.
The Parent High Court refers to the Court where a person first became a judge. So, if a judge
was first appointed as a Judge in the Madras High Court and later transferred to the Gujarat
High Court, the Madras High Court would be the Parent High Court of the judge.
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B. Views of Judicial Colleagues
Details of Consultation with Judicial Colleagues In Numbers

In Percentage

1 Colleague consulted

35

9.70

2 colleagues consulted

66

18.28

Number of consultees not clear

226

62.60

No record of any consultation

34

9.42

Table 1: Views of Judicial Colleagues

The number of consultees is rarely mentioned expressly by the collegium.
Instead, it often has to be inferred from the use of singular/plural nouns and
other linguistic indicators.40 In the absence of any such indicators, it is not
possible to deduce the number of consultees from the resolution. It is also
not always clear if all consultees have shared their feedback. In only 8.03%
of the decisions, it is known for certain that all consultees have shared their
feedback.41
While it is not always stated clearly by the collegium, it seems that in 9.42%
of its decisions, no judges have been consulted due to the fact that there were
no judges serving in the Supreme Court from the concerned High Court. This
raises questions on the design of the consultative framework which has been
established. At present, this framework is frustrated when there is no serving
judge in the Supreme Court from a particular High Court, which happens quite
frequently for many States.
The substantive content of the consultation is not shared by the collegium.
Often, the collegium merely mentions that ‘some’ colleagues have been consulted. The reasons behind the omission of substantive content of these colleagues’ views may involve sensitive personal information concerning the
candidate. However, it is difficult to make the same argument when it comes
to the very fact of whether the consulted functionaries are in favour of a candidate or not. On the few instances where a description of the views of the colleague judges is shared, it has been through standardized and generic proforma
statements.42 The positive/negative substance of the views of the consultees has
not been recorded by the collegium in its minutes.
40

41
42

For example, one would infer that two judges were consulted when the collegium mentions the following; “while one of the two consultee-colleagues has offered no views about
his suitability, the other colleague has found him suitable for elevation”. ‘Supreme Court
of India’ (Supreme Court of India, 3 October 2017) <https://main.sci.gov.in/pdf/collegium/2017.10.03-Madras-6%20JOs.pdf> accessed 3 January 2021.
Every such instance is when only one colleague judge has been consulted.
The following proforma statement was quoted for as many as three candidates as constituting
the views of a colleague judge in a resolution dated October 3, 2017 for appointment of judges
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1.	 The Revelations about Justice P. Ganediwala
The lack of transparency about the consultative process is most evident in
the case of J. P. Ganediwala of the Bombay High Court. In January 2021, in
a case under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, J.
Ganediwala created a stir, through her controversial and regressive interpretation of what constitutes ‘sexual assault’, by saying that groping the breasts
of a minor without skin-to-skin contact does not constitute sexual assault.43
The uproar led to a scrutiny of her background, and it was revealed that two
‘judges conversant with the affairs of the Bombay High Court’ had objected
to her appointment.44 The two consulted judges had provided detailed analysis of J. P. Ganediwala’s judgements from the lower courts, cautioning against
her appointment on the ground that she lacked legal knowledge. However, the
Supreme Court collegium resolution, dated January 16, 2019, recommending
her for appointment does not make any mention of this. The resolution merely
notes that the views of judicial colleagues have been taken into consideration, without specifying whether such views were in favour of or against her
appointment.45
The case of J. Ganediwala came to limelight only due to a controversy. It
is quite possible that there may be other judges who have been recommended
by the collegium despite reservations from judicial colleagues. Unless the resolutions capture the nature of views being put forth by the consulted functionaries, it does not lead to any additional insight into the appointment process.
It also facilitates an avoidance of scrutiny about the collegium’s selection of
judges.

43

44

45

in the Kerala High Court: “that his integrity is very good and to his knowledge Shri ABC
carries good reputation as Judicial Officer; that he has found his intellectual acumen as befitting for a Judge of the High Court and that he is quite suitable for appointment as Judge of
the High Court of XYZ”. ‘Supreme Court of India’ (Supreme Court of India, 3 October 2017)
<https://main.sci.gov.in/pdf/collegium/2017.10.03-Kerala-3%20JOs.pdf> accessed on 3 January
2021.
Mani Chander, ‘Why Bombay HC’s ‘Sexual Assault under POCSO Needs Skin-to-Skin
Contact’ Observation is Deeply Problematic’ (The Times of India, 25 January 2021) <https://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/why-the-bombay-high-courts-judgment-acquitting-man-under-pocso-is-completely-flawed/articleshow/80437238.cms> accessed 1 February 2021.
Bhadra Sinha, ‘Judge, Who Passed Controversial POCSO Orders, was Appointed Despite
Reservation by 2 SC Judges’ (The Print, 30 January 2021) <https://theprint.in/judiciary/
judge-who-passed-controversial-pocso-orders-was-appointed-despite-reservation-by-2-scjudges/595571/> accessed 1 February 2021.
‘Supreme Court of India’ (Supreme Court of India, 16 January 2019) <https://main.sci.gov.in/
pdf/collegium/18-01-2019/4.2019.01.16-2_Advocates-Deferred_cases-BOMBAY.pdf> accessed
01 February 2021.
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C. Feedback from the Government (Union and State)
The Supreme Court collegium’s interface with the concerned State government and the Union Government happens at different stages of the appointment
process and in different ways.46 While there is a direct channel of communication between the Union Government and the Supreme Court collegium, there is
no direct dialogue between the State government and the Supreme Court collegium. The views of the State government are forwarded to the Supreme Court
collegium through the Union Government’s DoJ. The collegium takes these
views into consideration while deciding on the selection of candidates. As such,
between the two, the Union Government has a much greater influence over
the selection process, both in the structural arrangement and in practice. The
Supreme Court collegium is free to take decisions contrary to the views of the
State government, and there is no procedural recourse available with the State
government in such a case. On the other hand, even if ultimately bound by the
recommendations of the Supreme Court collegium, the Union Government can
return a file for reconsideration and also stall files indefinitely.47

1.	 Feedback from the State Government
Just as in the case of consultation with judicial colleagues, one would
expect the Supreme Court collegium to disclose the substance of the State government’s views in relation to individual candidates. The identities of functionaries, such as the Governor and the Chief Minister, are relatively easy to
ascertain. It is not an effective barrier if they are mentioned merely by designation even though it would be preferable to mention them by name as well. As
such, the Governor and the Chief Minister are not identified by name in any of
the resolutions.

D. Views of Chief Minister and Governor
Details of Consultation with Chief Minister/Governor In Numbers

In Percentage

Concurred with the HC Collegium’s
Recommendation

162

44.88

Objected to the HC Collegium’s Recommendation

10

2.77

Views of Chief Minister/Governor not clear

174

48.20

Views of Chief Minister/Governor not received

15

4.16

Table 2: Feedback from the State Government
46
47

See Section IV.
Sinha (n 35).
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The collegium’s policy, regarding recording the views of the Chief Minister
and the Governor, has been highly inconsistent. There are many resolutions
where it is clearly stated that the Chief Minister and the Governor have concurred with the recommendation of the High Court collegium. However, in
many other resolutions, the offices of the Chief Minister and the Governor
are not identified separately, and the collegium simply records the input of the
State government.
Even more frustratingly, the collegium has been inconsistent in recording the nature of the views. In many resolutions, the collegium has clearly
recorded the ‘concurrence’ of the Chief Minister/Governor/State government
with the recommendation made by the High Court collegium.48 In many other
resolutions, the collegium has merely acknowledged that the views of the Chief
Minister/Governor/State government have been considered, without stating
clearly if the views are positive or negative in relation to the recommendation.49
The views of the Chief Minister/Governor/State government are unclear in
48.20% of the recommendations.
In 4.16% of the recommendations, the views of the Chief Minister/Governor/
State Government were not received by the Supreme Court collegium in
time. There has been an objection by the Chief Minister/Governor/State government in relation to 2.77% of the recommendations.50 While objections by
the State government are not relevant in the same sense as that of the Union
Government, it is still indicative of political opposition to prospective candidates or to the overall pattern of appointments. In such cases, it is essential
that the government’s grounds for objection be open to public scrutiny.

48

49

50

‘Supreme Court of India’ (Supreme Court of India, 8 August 2018) <https://main.sci.gov.in/
pdf/collegium/20180808_1_pmt_ judges_uttarakhand_final.pdf> accessed 1 February 2021.
‘Supreme Court of India’ (Supreme Court of India, 26 March 2018) <https://main.sci.gov.in/
pdf/collegium/2018-march_7_pmt_Calcutta.pdf> accessed 1 February 2021.
This was in relation to a batch of recommendations made by the Karnataka HC collegium.
The objections of the Chief Minister were not in relation to individual candidates, but on the
broader point of inadequate representation of a cross-section of society on the High Court
Bench. The Governor questioned the efficiency of the candidates without specifying anybody
in particular. Of the ten recommendations to which objections were raised, the SC collegium
approved the appointment of five candidates. It rejected the appointment of one candidate and
returned four recommendations to the HC collegium. However, the decision to return/reject
certain candidates was seemingly taken on separate grounds as the SC collegium categorically dismissed the objections raised by the office of the Chief Minister and the Governor.
‘Supreme Court of India’ (Supreme Court of India, 4 December 2017) <https://main.sci.gov.in/
pdf/collegium/2017-December%204-10%20Advs-Karnataka_wm.pdf> accessed 10 December
2020.
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E. Feedback from Union Government
The DoJ is the focal agency of the executive in the matter of judicial
appointments. Generally, it is seen that the DoJ gets to articulate its views in
two contexts. First, when the Supreme Court Collegium is considering a recommendation made by the High Court collegium, it generally notes the views
of the DoJ along with those of the Governor and the Chief Minister. Second,
and more rarely, the DoJ returns certain recommendations to the collegium,
requesting reconsideration. Thus, the following information is essential in this
context:
1. Views of the DoJ at the time of initial consideration;
2.	 Views of the DoJ when requesting reconsideration of an appointment.
The objections raised by the Union Government perhaps constitute the most
contentious dimension in the process of judicial appointments. The collegium
system was created to prevent the executive from having a determinative role
in the appointment of judges. Limiting the influence of the executive in the
appointment of judges has been a non-negotiable assertion of the higher judiciary in India.51 The supposed interference by the executive, in the appointment
of judges to the Supreme Court and Chief Justices to the High Courts, has
often caused widespread controversy.52 Thus, it becomes important to analyse
the manner in which the Supreme Court collegium and the Union Government
have interacted in relation to the appointment of judges to the High Courts.
The Government of India, through the DoJ, has concurred with 12.74% of
the recommendations made by the High Court collegiums at the time of the
matter being considered by the Supreme Court collegium. In relation to 86.98%
of the recommendations, the stance of the DoJ is not clear from the language
used by the Supreme Court collegium. The collegium, in these cases, has
merely noted that the views of the DoJ have been considered, without specifying the tenor of the views. At this initial stage, the DoJ has objected to only
0.28% of recommendations.53
51

52

53

SCAORA 2016 (n 1). In 2015, the Supreme Court struck down a constitutional amendment which sought to replace the collegium system with a National Judicial Appointments
Commission. The major ground for striking it down was the fact that it interfered with the
supremacy of the judiciary in the selection of judges. See (n 1).
Aneesha Mathur, ‘Gujarat Lawyers’ Body to Move Supreme Court Over Centre Blocking
Justice Kureshi Promotion’ (India Today, 1 July 2019) <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/
gujarat-lawyers-body-supreme-court-justice-kureshi-promotion-1559500-2019-07-01> accessed
12 July 2019; Anup Surendranath, Aparna Chandra and Suchindran Baskar Narayan, ‘Ball’s in
Supreme Court’ (The Indian Express, 27 April 2018) <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/indu-malhotra-woman-supreme-court-judge-k-m-joseph-chief-justice-of-india-dipak-misra-collegium-system-5153260/> accessed 10 July 2019.
This was in relation to the appointment of J Ravi Krishan Kapur of the Calcutta High Court.
The Department of Justice had raised the issue of J Kapur’s father, a practicing advocate at
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The DoJ has requested a reconsideration in relation to 5.26% of the recommendations approved by the Supreme Court collegium. Most of the objections
raised by the DoJ have been in relation to lawyers. Only 10.53% of the DoJ’s
objections pertained to judicial officers. Male lawyers constitute 84.21% of the
candidates whose files the DoJ has returned to the collegium.
The collegium has not noted the reasons behind the objections raised by the
DoJ in 85% of the cases. In 10.53% of the cases, the objections seem to have
been based on the fact that, the proposed appointees had not attained the minimum age of 45 years,54 on the date the High Court collegium recommended
their name.55 In relation to one objection by the DoJ, the collegium has clearly
noted that no reason was cited for the objection.

F. An Unequal Balance
At this point, it is important to remember that the collegium has committed
to the idea of ‘transparency’, with a rider of confidentiality, and not to the idea
of ‘confidentiality’, with a rider of transparency.56 Thus, even if the collegium
is choosing to not share the reasons cited by the DoJ in order to protect sensitive information of the candidates, nothing prevents it from clearly stating so
in its resolutions. On most occasions, the resolutions merely note the fact of
the objection without stating the reasons behind it. The disclosure of the reasons behind such objections may involve sensitive personal information concerning the candidates. Also, such reasons may not be related to a candidate’s
personal information. The collegium has not clarified its policy on what is considered ‘sensitive personal information’, and has not spelled out its threshold

54

55

56

Calcutta High Court, not having furnished a required undertaking. The collegium dismissed
the objection on the ground that the requirement of an undertaking from a practicing relative
is in the nature of an administrative instruction and not a mandatory requirement. ‘Supreme
Court of India’ (Supreme Court of India, 4 December 2017) <https://main.sci.gov.in/pdf/collegium/2017_December_04_6_Advs_Calcutta_wm.pdf>accessed 10 December 2020.
According to the prevailing Memorandum of Procedure agreed to between the Government
and the SC collegium, a lawyer must at least be of 45 years of age to be appointed as a Judge
in the High Court. The Constitution does not prescribe an age requirement, but requires a
minimum number of years in professional experience.
The Misra collegium decided to return the recommendations to the Calcutta HC collegium.
The SC collegium has usually overlooked such lacuna if the candidates have crossed the age
limit of 45 years by the time their candidature is being considered by the SC collegium, even
if the candidates were not 45 years old at the time of being recommended by the HC collegium. In its initial decision to accept the recommendation of the Calcutta HC collegium, the
SC collegium had followed the same policy for one candidate and had decided to relax the age
criterion for the other candidate. Also, there have been instances of other recommendations
with similar lacuna where there is no record of the Department of Justice raising an objection.
(One such candidate was recommended again by the Gogoi collegium when he had attained
the age of 45 years and was subsequently appointed as a judge). ‘Supreme Court of India’
(Supreme Court of India, 8 August 2018) <https://main.sci.gov.in/pdf/collegium/20180808_2_
advs_calcutta_final.pdf> accessed 12 December 2020.
Re: Transparency in Collegium (n 4).
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for choosing confidentiality over transparency. It has provided no explanation
for its decision to conceal the details of the objections raised by the DoJ. While
it is theoretically possible that every such instance involved sensitive personal
information about a candidate, the collegium’s propensity for opacity means
that we cannot be entirely sure of that.
As a logical corollary to its decision of not sharing the reasons behind the
objections raised by the DoJ, the collegium has also not reasonably explained
its responses to such objections. No reasons have been cited for reversing its
earlier acceptance of a candidate, and no reasons have been cited for persisting
with a candidate.57 The rationale for its response can be reasonably understood
in only 15.79% of such decisions.58 When the name of a prospective appointee
is sent to the DoJ, after being cleared by the High Court collegium and then
approved by the Supreme Court collegium, one would hope that the Supreme
Court collegium would reverse its decision only in exceptional situations.
However, due to the opaque practice of the collegium, of all cases where it
has reversed its decision, the reasons for such reversal are unknown in 90% of
cases.59

G. Publishing Reasoned Decisions
The Supreme Court collegium not only resolved to publish its decisions,
but also undertook to share the reasons for them.60 It qualified its intention to
share reasons with the condition of confidentiality. It is reasonable to expect
that some kind of substantive explanation would suffice the requirement of a
reasoned decision.
When considering a recommendation from a High Court collegium, the
range of decisions taken by the Supreme Court collegium can be classified into
the following alternative categories:
1. It has accepted the recommendation;
57

58

59

60

On certain occasions, while reiterating a recommendation, the collegium has noted that the
objections of the Department of Justice are not based on any fresh material, but on materials already on record and considered by the collegium. The collegium has often used this
as justification for persisting with a candidate. However, without the substance of the objections revealed, such justifications cannot qualify as ‘reasons’ for its decisions. Ignoring
an objection on a technicality does not enhance the understanding of the public. ‘Supreme
Court of India’ (Supreme Court of India, 16 January 2019) <https://main.sci.gov.in/pdf/collegium/18-01-2019/5.2019.01.16-1_Adv._and1_JO-CALCUTTA-Combined.pdf> accessed 12
December 2020.
Two decisions concerning the age-limit requirement and one where the Department of Justice
had not cited any reasons for its objection.
There are 10 such instances, where the SC collegium has reversed its decision after receiving
objection from the DoJ. The reasons for reversal are spelled out in only one case.
Re: Transparency in Collegium (n 4).
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2. It has deferred its decision on the recommendation;
3. It has rejected the recommendation;
4.	 It has returned the recommendation to the High Court collegium.
When considering a situation, where its recommendation has been returned
by the DoJ, requesting reconsideration, the range of decisions can be classified
into the following alternative categories:
1. It has reiterated the recommendation;
2. It has rejected the recommendation;
3. It has returned the recommendation to the High Court collegium;
4.	 It has deferred the decision.
In the eventuality of any of the above-mentioned decisions being taken, the
expectation is that the collegium would furnish reasons for its decisions. The
reasons need to be lucid enough to explain why the collegium decided in one
manner and not in another.61 Generic explanations, which do not underscore
the specific grounds of a decision, are not helpful in understanding the reasoning behind any decision.
The Supreme Court collegium has completely failed to deliver on its
promise of publishing ‘reasoned’ decisions. The reasons are evident in
only 4.43% of the decisions taken by it. Most instances of reasoned decisions coincide with a decision to return or reject a recommendation from
a High Court collegium. That does not, however, mean that decisions to
reject or return a recommendation are often reasoned. Reasons have been
given in only 10.81% of the cases where a recommendation has been
returned or rejected. 75% of such reasons constitute a recommended candidate’s non-fulfilment of the ‘income criterion’ set by the collegium.62

61

62

For example, it would be relevant to understand why certain recommendations are returned
to the HC collegium and certain other recommendations are rejected, especially when returning a recommendation has almost had the same effect as a rejection. Only in extremely rare
instances has the name of a candidate been sent to the SC collegium a second time after having been returned once.
There seems to be an income level, which the collegium requires, for lawyers to be considered for a High Court judgeship. Recently, there has been some controversy around an
effort by the collegium to relax the income criteria. See Maneesh Chhibber, ‘Relaxing
Income Criteria for judges’ Post is Case of Overreach by Supreme Court Collegium’
(The Print, 18 February 2019) <https://theprint.in/opinion/relaxing-judges-income-criteria-feeds-doubts-over-supreme-court-collegium-system/194396/> accessed 10 November 2019;
Pradeep Thakur, ‘Supreme Court Collegium Dilutes Norms to Pick Judges’ (The Times of
India, 2 April 2019) <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/supreme-court-collegium-dilutes-norms-to-pick-judges/articleshow/68679530.cms> accessed 11 November 2019.
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25% of the reasons deal with a recommended candidate not fulfilling the ‘age
criterion’.63

1.	 Reasons as the essence of transparency
The disclosure of ‘reasoned decisions’ is at the core of any commitment
to transparency in the matter of judicial appointments. The decisions of the
Supreme Court collegium are eventually public knowledge – when the appointees are notified by the government and when they assume office after taking
oath. So, the public is already aware about who the Supreme Court collegium
has recommended for judgeship. However, the public does not know ‘why’ a
particular person has been selected and others rejected. The core of a transparent appointment process is not the disclosure of who is being appointed,
which inevitably has to be notified to the public. The essence of transparency
is to share the ‘reasons’ for which one candidate is preferred to others. Thus,
it becomes important to learn both the criteria and the grounds, on which a
particular candidate is selected and others are rejected. Without information
explaining the selection of candidates, the published resolutions do not enhance
our understanding of the appointment process, which ought to be the touchstone of any transparent practice.64

2.	 Concerns of Privacy and Confidentiality
It may be reasonable for the collegium to be mindful of the reputational
interests of the candidates while sharing the reasons for its decisions. In particular, the reasons for rejecting or returning a recommendation may involve
concerns of privacy and confidentiality. However, the collegium is expected to
maintain a purposive balance between the objective of transparency and the
need for confidentiality. Privacy should not become a ground for completely
evading the requirement of a reasoned decision.
It would be disingenuous to contend that the reasons for the collegium’s
decisions can never be revealed. For example, the Supreme Court collegium
frequently defers taking a decision on recommendations received from the
High Court collegiums. Mostly, the Supreme Court collegium does not explain
the reason for deferring its decision. Unlike rejecting a candidate, which may
involve damaging personal or professional details about them, deferring a decision may involve purely administrative factors, such as a lack of records, delay
in receiving inputs from consulted functionaries, etc. In such cases, disclosing

63

64

This includes candidates who have either not attained the minimum age requirement or have
exceeded the maximum age restriction.
Rawlins (n 20).
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the reasons for deferring a decision is unlikely to violate the privacy of any of
the candidates.
There has been no conceptual clarity on what the collegium considers to be
worthy of confidentiality. Also, there is no clear benchmark, which has been
articulated by the collegium, to determine if a particular information ought to
be published or concealed. Thus, there is a compelling need for the Supreme
Court collegium to articulate a definitive policy on matters constituting ‘confidential’, ‘private’, or ‘sensitive’ information concerning a candidate.
It is important to remember that, in any case, privacy has not been recognized as an absolute right in India. The Supreme Court, while upholding the
right to privacy as a fundamental right,65 has categorically held that the right
is not absolute or unrestricted. Reasonable restrictions can be imposed on
the right to privacy on grounds of compelling public interest.66 Judges in the
higher judiciary have the power to influence the lives of millions of people in
extremely significant ways. Therefore, the public has a right to be informed
about the rationale through which such power is vested in certain individuals.
The extent of authority vested with judges means that the claim of the public,
to be informed about the appointment process, stands on a much better footing
than claims of any candidate’s privacy, especially in the absence of a clear policy on the gradation of information concerning a candidate.
As we have already observed,67 the claim of confidentiality ought not
to become a permanent shadow over the need for transparency. The collegium ought to try for a more meaningful balance by avoiding either of these
extremes.

3.	 Critical Decisions
Returning, rejecting, or reiterating a recommendation are perhaps the most
critical decisions requiring a reasoned explanation. When the Supreme Court
collegium returns or rejects a recommendation, whether at the first instance or
in response to an objection raised by the DoJ, it is effectively either a disapproval of the decision by the concerned High Court collegium, or a reversal
of its own decision to approve the recommendation. The reiteration of a recommendation essentially means that any objections, which the DoJ may have
raised, are refuted. In all such cases, the reasons for such overruling, reversal, or reiteration comprise critical information, which should be shared if the
objective is to be transparent.
65
66
67

KS Puttaswamy v Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India).
ibid [86] (J Abhay Manohar Sapre) and [73] (J Sanjay Kishan Kaul).
See “An Unequal Balance” under Section VI.
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However, the practice of the collegium leaves us with no better understanding of the situation. Instead of fostering transparency, it provides more grounds
of mistrust in the decision-making process. The lack of reasoned decisions is
especially baffling when, among the same batch of recommendations from a
High Court collegium, some recommendations are accepted and the rest are
returned/rejected without any assigned reason.
The collegium is also not forthcoming in sharing the complaints it receives
against the proposed appointees. In its resolutions dealing with multiple recommendations, it often notes that complaints have been received, but rarely
specifies the candidates against whom such complaints have been made.68 The
collegium has uniformly dismissed all such instances of complaints as lacking
prima facie merit, without sharing the details of the complaints even once.

VII. THE DITHERING DEFERRALS
A decision to defer delays the actual substantive decision. Instead of
deciding on the merits of the recommendation received from a High Court
collegium, the Supreme Court collegium uses this option to defer the decision-making to a later, unspecified date. Adopting this option has particular
ramifications in relation to the appointment of additional judges. Such appointments relate to existing vacancies. On the other hand, appointment of permanent judges, from their position as additional judges, does not immediately
affect the availability of workforce. Filling up vacancies in time is crucial for
the continued capacity of courts to manage case load. Thus, one would hope
that the collegium would not opt for deferrals in the absence of clearly stated
reasons.
Out of every five substantive decisions taken by the collegium, one is a
deferral, often without specifying any reason. The Misra collegium opted for
deferral more often than the Gogoi collegium. Overall, the ratio of substantive
decisions to deferrals is 2.66 for the Misra collegium and 6.3 for the Gogoi collegium. The Misra collegium has given reasons only in 5% of its deferrals, and
the Gogoi collegium has not specified reasons even once.
It needs to be noted that that, there have been multiple deferrals in relation
to the same candidate and, thus, the number of deferrals does not mean the
candidature of as many persons has been deferred. It is also important to note
that the number of deferrals does not mean that substantive decisions regarding
68

As it was impossible to identify the individual candidates against whom complaints have been
made, it has been presumed that complaints have been filed against all candidates discussed
in a resolution. This is a presumption of necessity. By this calculation, complaints have been
made against 30.47% of all candidates recommended by different HC collegiums.
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as many candidates are yet to be taken. In many cases, subsequent to the
deferrals, final decisions have been taken by the collegium.69

VIII. ASSESSING TRANSPARENCY: PHASE TWO
As is evident, between October 3, 2017 and October 3, 2019, the collegium
has definitively failed in introducing substantially tangible measures of transparency through the publication of its resolutions. However, the collegium’s
practice after October 3, 2019 is even more disappointing. It seems to have
reduced the entire exercise of publishing resolutions to a completely meaningless formality. This drastic change was initiated by the Gogoi collegium,
in the resolutions published on October 15, 2019, during J. Gogoi’s last month
in office.70 The other two members of the collegium at the time were J. S.A.
Bobde and J. N.V. Ramana.71 As the office of the Chief Justice will be occupied
successively by J. Bobde and J. Ramana until August 6, 2022, a course correction by the collegium seems unlikely until then, at least.
After October 3, 2019, while the collegium has continued the practice of
publishing resolutions, it has merely listed the names recommended by it for
appointment without any other detail whatsoever. There has been no disclosure
about the candidates, who have been recommended by the different High Court
collegiums, and the decision taken in relation to the candidates whose names
have not been recommended. There is no information regarding the other
judges from the Supreme Court, who have been consulted in the matter of
appointment, and the nature of their views. There has been no mention about
the views of the Chief Minister or the Governor. Further, there are no details
about any objections received from the DoJ. In essence, the published resolutions constitute mere communication of the final list of names recommended
for judgeship without shedding any light on the process through which the final
selection was done or the reasons behind the selection.
While the resolutions can still be found under the heading of ‘collegium resolutions’ on the website of the Supreme Court of India,72 the files themselves
69

70

71

72

For example, decision regarding the candidature of Mr Tirathankar Ghosh was first deferred
on March 26, 2018 without assigning any reason. Subsequently, his candidature was approved
by the SC collegium on December 4, 2018. Afterwards, he has assumed office in Calcutta
High Court. Something similar happened to Justice Savitri Ratho of Orissa High Court.
J Ranjan Gogoi retired from office on November 17, 2019. In a controversial development,
within 1 year of his retirement, on March 16, 2020, he was nominated by President of India to
the Council of States, the Upper House in the Indian Parliament. Accepting any kind of political office after retirement is quite uncommon in the Indian higher judiciary.
The collegium for appointing Supreme Court judges also included J Arun Mishra and J RF
Nariman.
‘Resolutions of Collegium’ (Supreme Court of India) <https://main.sci.gov.in/collegium-resolutions> accessed 3 January 2021.
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have been retitled as ‘statements’. In another development, which comes across
as deeply cynical, the documents uploaded do not mention the existing members of the collegium. Earlier, all resolutions were signed off by the existing
members of the collegium. While it may appear harmless, such a practice
compromises the archival quality of these resolutions. There is no official
notification about the identity of collegium members, and it always has to be
ascertained by looking at the seniority list on a given date. Determining the
seniority list involves the filtration of judges based on a variety of factors,
especially when it involves a batch of several judges appointed on the same
day. Thus, this practice makes it much harder for someone, reading these resolutions ten or twenty years from now, to identify the authors of any particular
resolution.
It is important to note that the collegium has never given any indication of
its intention to change the pattern of the published resolutions. It has also not
bothered to disclose the reason behind such a drastic and regressive step. There
is speculation that the collegium’s decision was prompted by increased scrutiny of its decision-making.73 If this is indeed true, then this move reflects an
unhealthy comfort with secrecy that seems deeply entrenched in the judicial
structure.
While the decision by the collegium to publish its resolutions was obviously
a positive one, one has to wonder if the actual practice of publishing the resolutions has been reduced to token symbolism. As we have seen, the snippets of
information shared by the collegium, through its resolutions, do not facilitate a
better understanding of its functioning.

IX. CONCLUSION
Initially, until October 3, 2019, the published resolutions of the Supreme
Court collegium served the limited utility of making the collegium’s decisions public. Earlier, information about High Court collegium recommendations being accepted/returned/rejected was only accessible to those in the
active circles of legal profession or the media. Similarly, one got to know about
the tussles between the Supreme Court collegium and the DoJ only through
media reports, or if one was active in the relevant circles of the legal profession. Through the published resolutions, the public had a more immediate and
direct source for such information. However, even accounting for the latitude
73
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of maintaining necessary confidentiality,74 the collegium failed to deliver on its
promise of publishing reasoned decisions to ensure transparency.
It did not clearly state information regarding the colleague judges who were
consulted. The public did not know how many colleague judges were consulted. It also did not clearly state if their views were positive or negative. We
were left with no answers as to why certain recommendations were returned,
while others were accepted. We had no knowledge of the reasons for which
the DoJ had objected to the appointment of certain candidates. We were clueless about the grounds on which the collegium overruled the objections of the
DoJ and also the grounds on which it accepted them. No reasons were given
when decisions on certain recommendations were deferred. While there was a
serious gap in terms of the reasons behind the decisions, we at least had better
access to the decisional process of the collegium.
Since October 3, 2019, the collegium has retreated into a deeper cocoon of
secrecy. Now, the public is merely informed about the final recommendations
of the collegium without any other detail whatsoever. So far, there is no evidence of the collegium actively looking into the informational needs of various stakeholders. As the most basic purpose of any transparency initiative is
to generate trust and credibility, the structure and content of shared information must be decided through a consultative dialogue and not through unilateral
decisions.
In recent years, the Indian judiciary has faced scepticism about its capacity
and willingness to discharge its constitutional role.75 There have been judgements on extremely sensitive issues, which have provoked disappointment
regarding compromised legal arguments,76 and accusations of having caved in
to majoritarian politics.77 There have been concerns regarding the judiciary
having different standards for different classes of people.78 The judiciary has
74
75

76

77

78
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been perceived to be failing in its constitutional obligations, not only through
some issues that it has decided, but also through the many issues which it has
ignored.79 The claim, that the Indian Supreme Court is facing a crisis,80 is not
merely a figment of imagination.
In light of this state of affairs, it is disturbing that the Supreme Court collegium has chosen to compromise the only measure of transparency that it has
initiated in all these years. By refusing to address the crisis of public trust
though transparent appointment practices, the collegium is endangering the
judiciary’s institutional capacity to discharge its functions. The judiciary’s relevance is dependent on continued public support and trust. The lack of transparency has an adverse effect on how the judiciary is perceived by people.
In its current iteration, the practice of publishing resolutions definitely falls
short of the threshold of transparency. The satisfaction of the stakeholders,
with the transparency standards of an institution, is the crucial benchmark,
and not that of the authorities who administer the institution.81 The collegium’s decision to publish its resolutions was the first step in the direction of
making its functioning more transparent and in addressing the trust deficit it
faces. It should not be a ceremonial step, but an effective one. It would be a
wasted opportunity if the collegium does not use this platform to meaningfully
address the issue of transparency and consequently, enhance the judiciary’s
credibility.
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